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THE TREATMENT OF TERRORISTS IN THE ISRAELI
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Paula E. Marcus*
INTRODUCTION
The Israeli occupied territories1 are the focal point of the Arab-Israeli conflict.' The hostility of the Arab inhabitants of the territories
manifests itself in continuous violence against both the Israeli administration and the civilian population of the occupied territory.3 Israel has
promulgated measures to ensure that those instigating and participating in the violence in the occupied territories are prevented from further threatening state security and public welfare." At the same time,
however, international law and the laws applicable to the territories afford security offenders procedural protections and opportunities to challenge the orders issued against them.
The Israeli military administration, in response to the violence in the
occupied territories, issues administrative orders against the perpetra* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington College of Law,The American University.
1. See E. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 35-37
(1985) (discussing the commencement of the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
Golan Heights, Sinai, and East Jerusalem as a result of the 1967 Six Day War).
2. See D. HIRST, THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH 206 (1984) (discussing the
history of the violence in the Middle East since the beginning of the Israeli occupation
of the territories).
3. Id. at 147-70. Shlomo Gazit, head of the military government from 1967-1974
under Minister of Defence Moshe Dyan, asserted that with regard to the people of the
occupied territories, "[A]dmittedly they can choose to follow a course of provocation,
disobedience, and sabotage, but they will not succeed in that way to overcome Israel,
they will only force it to apply preventive measures and severe penalties." Gazit, The
Occupied Territories Policy and Practice, MA'ARACHOT, Jan. 1970, cited in Milson,
How Not to Occupy the West Bank, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1986, at 15, 17 (1986).
4. See infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text (cataloging the measures employed to combat violence in the occupied territories). International law, particularly
the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, permit an occupying power to maintain stability in the occupied territory via administrative measures
against security offenders. Annex to the International Convention Concerning the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.I.A.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518 T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. This Comment asserts that the
laws of the Israeli military administration, rather than international legal standards,
are requisite to provide an understanding of the current laws of military occupation and
a determination of whether these international conventions are the definitive laws governing the Israeli-occupied territories is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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tors of violent attacks. The Israeli Supreme Court provides judicial review of military orders to ensure compliance with procedural rights.
Israeli Supreme Court decisions demonstrate arbitrariness, disproportionality between offense and countermeasure, and the imposition of
more stringent sanctions on Arab terrorists than on Jewish terrorists.
Both the laws of the Israeli administration and international standards
fail to define when emergency situations justify the predominance of
security needs over procedural protection. An objective standard is necessary to ensure consistent judicial review of the military orders issued
against those engaging in violence.
This Comment examines Israeli security measures employed to deal
with those engaged in violence in the occupied territories 'and endeavors
to reconcile national security interests with procedurally fair treatment
of those accused of committing violent acts in the territories. Part I of
this Comment presents a general history of the Arab-Israeli conflict
and the violence in the occupied territories. The continuing violence
demonstrates the need to implement measures to counter violent activity in the occupied territories. Part II explores the relevant international conventions that govern Israeli military occupation. This section
addresses Israeli administration of the occupied territories, its security
measures, and the procedural safeguards that protect the rights of
those accused of violent conduct. Part III explains the predominant
sanctions the military administration has employed to deter violence in
the occupied territories. Part IV analyzes the judicial treatment of security offenders and examines the standards of evaluating security concerns. Part V suggests a judicial formula to reduce the inconsistencies
in making decisions based on the predominance of security needs.
I.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

A.

THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

Israel has existed in a state of emergency since its inception, The
conflict among the Arabs and the Jews, however, preceded the establishment of the State of Israel and commenced as early as 1882, the
year of the first immigration of European Jews to Palestine.' During
the latter Nineteenth Century the population of Palestine was predomi5. See D. HIRST, supra note 2, at 13 (tracing the roots of the violence characterizing the history of the State of Israel). The Arab-Israeli conflict has precipitated five
wars: The War of Independence in 1948, the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the 1967 Six Day
War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 War in Lebanon. Id.
6. M. Shaked, Continuity and Change: An Overview, in THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES 181 (A. Rubenstein ed. 1984).
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nantly Arab and subject to the control of the Ottoman Empire.' The
Arab inhabitants of Palestine resented the arrival of the Jews,8 and
resorted to assaults on the new immigrants and their settlements.' Arab
violence intensified following the 1917 Balfour Declaration 0 expressing
the position of the British government 1 favoring the establishment of a
national home for the Jewish people in Palestine."2
British troops occupied Palestine from 1917 to 1918, and pursuant to
an agreement between the Allied Powers, Palestine was granted to the
United Kingdom as a mandated territory in 1922.13 During the 1920s4
and 1930s, violence escalated in Palestine under the British Mandate.
In 1937, the British Royal Commission, appointed to examine the situation in Palestine, recognized the impossibility of establishing a Jewish
or a bi-national state in Palestine 5 and recommended the partition of
Palestine. 6 On February 14, 1947 Great Britain announced its plans to
7. D. HIRST, supra note 2, at 15.
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id. at 22. Attacks took the form of plundering cattle or produce, and ambushing, robbing, or killing farmers. Id. In 1907, the Jewish immigrants set up their
first organization, the Hashomer (The Guardian), to defend themselves against Arab
attacks on their settlements. Id. at 27.
10. Letter from Lord Arthur James Balfour, British Foreign Secretary to Lord
Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917), reprinted in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 17-18 (W. Laquer

ed. 1970) [hereinafter

THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER].

This letter, known as the Balfour

Declaration, states, in pertinent part:
His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish
community in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in
any other country.
Id. at 18.
11. Note, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 417 (L. Sohn ed. 1967) [hereinafter
Sohn]. The Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with article 22 of the
Covenant of the League, approved the British Mandate over Palestine on behalf of the
League of Nations on July 24, 1922. Id.
12. Shaked, supra note 6, at 181.
13. Sohn, supra note 11, at 417.
14. H. BIN TALAL, PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION 31 (1981). After 1921, increased Zionist land acquisition and settlement activities exacerbated the already
strained relationship between the Arab and Zionist communities. Id. at 32. The large
increase in Jewish immigration during this period resulted in increasingly violent disorder within the Arab community. Id. The British authorities, however, rejected Arab
requests to cease the transfer of Arab-owned land to Jews and to end all Jewish immigration. Id.

15. See

THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER,

supra note 10, at 57 (reprinting the report of

the British Royal Commission on Palestine). The Commission concluded that a severe
conflict emerged between the two national factions within Palestine. Id. The drastic
religious, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences separated, rather than united the
two peoples, thereby rendering peaceful cohabitation impossible. Id.
16. Id.
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terminate the Mandate 17 because it became unworkable in light of the
growing violence among the Arabs and the Jews. 8
Subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor
of a plan to partition Palestine."' When the British Mandate terminated, the Jewish community proclaimed the formation of the State of
Israel.20 The Arabs, refusing to acknowledge the State of Israel or ac21
cept the Partition Plan, commenced a campaign of guerilla activities.
When Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon intervened on behalf of their
Arab brethren in Palestine, the conflict escalated into a full- scale
war.22 The war ended with a series of armistice agreements between
the new State of Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. 3
The next major clash in the Arab-Israeli conflict was ihe 1956 Sinai
Campaign.24 The Israelis invaded the Sinai in reaction to terrorist raids
from Gaza and Sinai, 25 and Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping
in the Straits of Tiran. 2 A cease fire ended the war, lifted the blockade, and prevented major hostilities between Israel and Arab nations
17. A/286 (3 April 1947); GAOR, First Special Session, Vol. I, at 183. The British government announced on May 14, 1948 that it was not prepared to govern Palestine indefinitely and that the Arabs and Jews could not agree upon the means to govern
Palestine together. Id.
18. Id.
19. G.A. Res. 181 II, U.N. GAOR 131-150 (1947); see Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, GAOR, II, Supp. II (A/364), Vol. 1, 29-35, 3962 (1947) (appraising both the Jewish and Arab cases seeking the establishment of
respective Jewish and Palestinian states); see H. BIN TALAL, supra note 14, at 36 (stating that the Jewish authorities in Palestine accepted the partition plan to which the
Arabs in Palestine as well as those in other Arab states were bitterly opposed).
20. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 LAWS OF THE STATE
OF ISRAEL 3-5 (1948), reprinted in J. MOORE, THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT 934
(1977).
21.

A. GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1978).

See H. BIN TALAL, supra note 14, at 36 (stating that ten hours after the Israeli declaration of statehood, the armed forces of the neighboring Arab states entered Palestine
at the request of the Arab inhabitants).
22. J. MOORE, supra note 20, at xxiv (1977). A cease-fire negotiated under the
auspices of the United Nations terminated the hostilities. H. BIN TALAL, supra note 14,
at 37. As a result control of the area known as the Gaza Strip, Jordan controlled the
area known as the West Bank and the Eastern (Old) City of Jerusalem, and Israel
controlled the Western (New) City of Jerusalem, the coastal areas, and the northern
part of the former British Mandate. Id. Additionally, the war resulted in a massive
displacement of Palestinian Arabs who became refugees in neighboring Arab states. Id.
at 38.
23. J. MOORE, supra note 20, at xxiv.
24. Id. at xxvii.
25. D. HIRST, supra note 2, at 200. Egypt pursued a policy of infiltration, sending
Palestinians, called "fedayeen" (those who sacrificed themselves), on raids into Israel.

Id.
26.

Id.
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until 1967.27
B.

TERRORISM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

In April 1967, Syria commenced the bombing of Israeli border villages while Egypt mobilized its armed forces in the Sinai and imposed
another blockade against Israeli shipping.28 These actions resulted in
the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israeli forces defeated the combined
forces of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan.2 9 The Six Day War resulted in Israeli occupation of the territories of East Jerusalem,3 the West Bank,31
the Sinai, 32 the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights.33
In addition to territorial gains, the Six Day War further aggravated
the Arab-Israeli conflict. A large, hostile Arab population came under
Israeli governmental control.34 The Israeli government subsequently set
up a military administration to manage the occupied territories,sa
27. J. MOORE, supra note 20, at xxvii.
28. N. LORCH, ONE LONG WAR 113-15 (1976).
29. See id. at 119-30 (outlining the military maneuvers that occurred during each
day of the Six Day War).
30. See E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 35 (discussing the incorporation of East Jerusalem in the Jerusalem municipality). Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration were
legally imposed on East Jerusalem following the cessation of hostilities. Administrative
& Judicial Order No. 1, June 30, 1967 KOVETZ HATAKANOT 2690.
31. See W.T. MALLISON & S. MALLISON, THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL WORLD ORDER 248 (1986) (indicating that the term "West Bank" refers to
the land on the west bank of the Jordan river).
32. See Egypt-Israel, Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 1978,
22 KITVEI AMANA (Israel Treaty Series No. 857) 510, 512 (providing, as part of the
Camp David Agreement, for the return of the Sinai to Egypt).
33. J. MOORE, supra note 20, at xxvii. The Golan Heights were annexed to Israel
in 1980. D. HIRST, supra note 2, at 369.
The legal justification for Israeli actions in the Six Day War is greatly debated.
Jordan claims that Israel entered the West Bank unlawfully in violation of the United
Nations Charter. A. GERSON, supra note 21, at 71. Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids
the use of force in contravention of the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see U.N. Doec. S/RES/242 (1967), reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE (F. Jabber ed. 1970) (requesting that
Israel withdraw its armed forces from the territories occupied in 1967).
Israel argues, however, that Egypt, when it closed the Straits of Tiran and deployed
forces on the Israeli borders, indicated an intention to initiate hostilities. A. GERSON,
supra note 21, at 71. The international community has generally accepted Israeli actions as a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense. Id. at 73. While the international community may accept the validity of the Israeli actions as an exercise of the
right of self-defense, it has not accepted the validity of the continued Israeli occupation. Id.; see H. BIN TALAL, supra note 14, at 69 (asserting that a contention of selfdefense is invalid when applied to territorial claims). Contra J. STONE, ISRAEL AND
PALESTINE 52 (1981) (stating that the continued Israeli presence in the territories is
lawful because the Israelis entered in self-defense).
34. R. HALABI, THE WEST BANK STORY 51 (1981). The Arab population of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip is approximately 1.1 million. Id.
35. See infra notes 103-15 and accompanying text (detailing the Israeli system of
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within a legal framework composed of principles derived from international law, 86 existing local laws, 37 and Israeli security legislation. 8
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, 31
had an adverse impact on relations between the military government
and the people of the occupied territories.40 The National Covenant of
the PLO, issued in 1968, provides the ideological basis for the war
against Israel 42 and mandates that the only way to achieve a Palestinian homeland is to launch a continuing armed struggle against Israel.43
The growth and consolidation of the PLO after the 1967 War
resulted in a dramatic increase in violent and subversive activities in
the occupied territories."
During the 1970s, the conflict received a new impetus ivith the establishment of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.45 A faction of Gush
Emunim, the religious party of Israel, initiated a program of massive
administration of the occupied territories).
36. See infra notes 68-100 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of
the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Israeli administration of the occupied territories).
37. See A. GERSON, supra note 21, at 113 (discussing the municipal governmental
system that operated in the West Bank under Jordanian law). The Israeli administration retained this governmental system pursuant to the Hague Regulations of 1907. Id.
38. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Emergency Dcfence Regulations authorizing the implementation of measures against terrorists).
39. J. LAFFIN, THE P.L.O. CONNECTIONS 17 (1982).
40. R. HALABI, supra note 34, at 87. A movement of Palestinian self-determination
emerged at the same time the Palestinian National Covenant of 1966 was completed. J.
STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 12 (1959). The PLO claims
to speak in the name of all Palestinian Arabs. H. BIN TALAL, supra note 14, at 46.
41. NATIONAL COVENANT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, July
1968, translated in BASIC POLITICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE ARMED PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 137-41 (Kadie ed. 1969) [hereinafter PLO COVENANT].

42. R. HALABI, supra note 34, at 190.
43. PLO COVENANT, supra note 41, art. 9. Article 9 of the PLO Covenant states:
"Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy,
not merely a tactical phase." Id. Yassir Arafat, leader of the PLO, has said: "Our
people ...

have the right to use all means in their fight against oppression." (Reuter,

Tunis, Sept. 3, 1985).
44. Vardi, The Administered Territories and the Internal Security of Israel, in
JUDEA, SAMRIA & GAZA: VIEWS OF THE PRESENT & FUTURE 174 (D. Elazar ed.
1982). The PLO sought to establish bases of armed resistance and inspire civil disobedience among the local population. See R. HALABI, supra note 34, at 196 (explaining
that terrorist training camps were established in the West Bank immediately after the
commencement of the occupation).
45.

W.

CLAIRBORNE

& E.

CODY,

THE WEST BANK:

HOSTAGE OF HISTORY

I

(1980); cf. H. BIN TALAL, supra note 14, at 73 (arguing that the Jewish settlements
violate article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION, TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN

ISRAELI-OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA 3 (1978) [hereinafter NATIONAL LAWYERS
GUILD REPORT] (discussing United Nations condemnation of Israeli civilian settle-

ments in the occupied territories).
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Jewish settlement in the occupied territories.4 The settlements were

part of a strategic plan to force the Palestinians to abandon the West

Bank.4 7 The plan has resulted in the increased hostility of the Palestinians towards the Israeli administrators of the West Bank.48
The prevailing characteristic of the Arab-Israeli Conflict of the
1980s is the continuous, random terrorist attacks on civilians. 49 Both
Palestinian 50 and Jewish 51 inhabitants of the occupied territories have
participated in violent attacks on civilians. The military administration
responds swiftly to Palestinian attacks on the Jewish inhabitants of the
occupied territories with harsh sanctions including curfews and random
searches of Palestinians, 52 dismissal of Palestinian mayors in the occupied territories, 53 and deportations. " Jewish attacks on Palestinian in-

habitants of the occupied territories, however, have not received serious
treatment.55
This continuous pattern of isolated attacks culminated in an out46. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 146. The Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful)
movement, created in 1974, successfully lobbies for Israeli government approval of the
settlement of the occupied territories. Id.
47. See World Zionist Organization's "Master Plan for the Development and Settlement in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983," U.N. Doe. A/34/605 Annex and U.N. Doe
S/13582 Annex (1979) (announcing plans for between 46 and 75 settlements in the
West Bank over the next five years). The Israeli government, however, has not officially
adopted this plan. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 147.
48. W. CLAIRBORNE & E. CODY, supra note 45, at 1. See H. BIN TALAL, supra
note 14, at 46 (describing Arab opposition to the Israeli settlements).
49. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, P.L.O. & PALESTINIAN-INSPIRED TERRORISM, 1982-1985: THE CONTINUING RECORD OF VIOLENCE 1-11 (1985)
(setting forth a chronology of Palestinian terrorism in the occupied territories and in
Israel). Israel initiated the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to eliminate southern Lebanon
as a base for launching terrorist attacks against Israel. D. HisT, supra note 2, at 398400.
50. See PLO Terrorists Murder Again, appendix A (Oct. 10, 1985) (available at
the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D.C.) (stating that between August 1984 and October 1985, 23 Israelis were killed in 16 separate incidents); see also R. HALABI, supra
note 34, at 155 (discussing the murder of a student in Hebron, in the occupied West
Bank). Hebron, the center of much violence in the West Bank, is considered a "[t]ense
microcosm of the Arab-Israeli conflict" because it is the ancient focal point of two
religions. Rupert, Faiths Contest Abraham's Tomb, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1987, at 16,
col. 2.
51. See R. HALABI, supra note 34, at 136 (discussing the car bombing attacks on
the Palestinian mayors of Nablus and Ramallah in the occupied territories).
52. Id. at 55.
53. Id. at 36.
54. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayor of Hebron's appeal of a deportation order to the Israeli Supreme Court).
55. See Friedman, The Case of the Unsolved Bombings, 1982 THE NATION 681,
681 (discussing the failure of military administrators of the occupied territories to investigate the bombing attacks on the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah). Members of
the Gush Emunim and the Kach Party of Rabbi Meir Kahane were implicated in the
attacks. Id.
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break of widespread demonstrations and violence in December 1987.0
Mass demonstrations involving stone throwing, tire burning, and
firebombs occurred throughout the occupied territories. 57 The Israeli
army deployed additional troops in both the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank, and responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition
killing or injuring both rioters and bystanders.5 8 In addition, Palestinians have killed Arabs viewed as collaborators with Jewish authorities"
and some Jewish settlers have been killed or wounded.60 In response,
the Israeli administration has arrested thousands of Palestinians and
deported those individuals allegedly responsible for inciting the riots. 1
The arrests and deportations have not, however, deterred further acts
of violent protest and confrontations with the military. An underground
Palestinian leadership and factions of the PLO have coordinated the
protests against military authorities. 62 The involvement of armed Jewish settlers of the West Bank has also increased. 3
The volume and severity of the terrorist attacks demonstrate the extreme hostility the Arab residents feel toward Israeli occupation. Jew-

ish attacks against Arabs similarly demonstrate a trend of Israeli extremism toward retribution. Israel has developed a military
administration to govern the territories and impose countermeasures intended to deter acts of violence and protect both the military administration and the local population.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ISRAELI

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
International legal conventions provide a framework for a military
56. Kifner, The Face of Rage in Gaza: Frustrated Youth, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21,
1987, at Al, col. 2. The violence began with a traffic accident which killed four Palestinian workers in Gaza. The vehicle allegedly collided with an Israeli-driven vehicle in
reprisal for the stabbing death of an Israeli in the Gaza markets a week before. Id.
57. Shipler, U.S. and Egypt Ask 6-Month Israel-Arab Restraint, N.Y. Times, Jan.
29, 1988, at A8, col. 3.
58. Friedman, Israel Army Decides to Deport 9 Arabs in Wake of Rioting, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
59. Crowell, Boy Killed and Man Lynched in a Clash of Arabs, N.Y. Times, Feb.
25, 1988, at A3, col. I.
60. Kifner, Six Die in Hijacking of a Bus in Israel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1988, at
Al, col. 5.
61. Id. See Friedman, Israel is Unhappy at U.S. Vote in U.N., N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1988, at A3, col. I (discussing the United Nations vote urging Israel not to deport
Palestinians from the occupied territories).
62. Kifner, From Palestinian Rage, New Leadership Rises, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
1988, at Al, col. 4.
63. Kifner, Settler Kills an Arab Amid Continuing Disorder, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9,
1988, at A6, col. 3.
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occupant. Israel has interpreted and implemented these conventions to
meet its own security needs. The laws of the Israeli administration of
the territories, however, ultimately govern the sanctions enforced
against terrorist activity.
A.

APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Under accepted principles of international law, an occupant acquires
a temporary right of control over the territory it occupies and its inhabitants." The current international legal regime governing the administration of occupied territories includes the Hague Regulations"" and the
Fourth Geneva Convention.66 These conventions arguably govern the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that commenced
in 1967.67
1. The 1907 Hague Regulations
The Hague Regulations are applicable to the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip through the operation of article 42 of
the Regulations. Article 42 defines "occupied territory" as territory actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. 8 The Israel army
occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the Six Day War
64. L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, DisPUTES, WAR & NEUTRALITY 436 (1952); G. VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY
TERRITORY 33-34 (1957); J. STONE, supra note 40, at 697;

M. GREENSPAN, THE MOD-

ERN LAW OF LAND AND WARFARE 223 (1959).

65. Hague Regulations, supra note 4, at vol. 32, p. 1803. The Hague Regulations,
drafted before World War I, focus on military necessity and the need to maintain
stability in occupied territories. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 23.
66. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. The Fourth Geneva Convention, which resulted from the brutal practices of the Axis powers in the occupied territories of Europe during the Second World War, emphasizes the protection of civilians
living in occupied territories. E. COHEN, supra note I, at 26. The Convention applies to
all situations of partial or total occupation. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4,
art. 2.
67. See Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent
Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1573 (1985) (arguing that the current laws of
belligerent occupation do not take into account the present reality of international
politics and need restructuring to deal with modern occupations).
68. Hague Regulations, supra note 4, art. 42. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations
makes no reference to the legitimacy of the sovereign the occupying power displaces. A
precondition for application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, is that the
occupying sovereign expel a legitimate sovereign from the disputed territory. See infra
note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention only to the occupation of the territory of a "High Contracting Party"). Contra
E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 51 (asserting that the drafters of the Hague Regulations
intended the Regulations to apply to situations where the previous sovereign of the
territory was a legitimate sovereign).
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of 1967 and continues to administer those territories. 9 Both the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip are occupied territories as defined in article
42; therefore, the Hague Regulations of 1907 apply to the Israel occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Israel concedes that the Hague Regulations apply to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip because the Regulations reflect norms of customary international law."0 The Israeli Supreme
Court considers customary international law and the Hague Regulations binding upon Israel regardless of whether Israel is a signatory to
the Regulations.7 1 The Israeli courts, however, predicate application of
the provisions of the Hague Regulations, on the absence of conflicting
domestic legislation.7 2 Therefore, where the Hague Regulations conflict
with the domestic laws of Israel, the Israeli law prevails.
The Hague Regulations permit an occupying power to act in accordance with its legitimate security concerns. Article 43 provides that the
occupying power may take any measures necessary to restore and ensure public order and safety.7 3 This article justifies Israeli security measures.7 4 To deter the violence that threatens the security and public
order of the occupied territories, the sanctions that the military admin69. J. MOORE, supra note 20, at xxvii.
70. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 51. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated "by 1939 the rules of land warfare laid down in the 1907 [Hague] Convention had been recognized by all civili[s]ed nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of men." Judgment of the International Tribunal for the
Trial of Major War Criminals (London 1946), Cmd. No. 6964, at 64. Additionally, the
spirit of the Hague Regulations is embodied in military manuals in many countries
around the world. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 24.
Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by a sense of legal obligation. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).

71. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 23. Israel has not ratified the Hague Regulations.
Id.; see Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. State of Israel, H.C. 302/72, 27(2) Piskei Din

177 (1972), translated in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384-348 (1975) (holding that the

court will examine the propriety of an administrative act in the occupied territories in
the light of customary international law when no written Israeli law applies).
72. Ayub v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 606/78 33(2) Piskei Din 113 (1978); see
Meron, West Bank and Gaza: Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw in the Periodof
Transition, 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 106, 111 (discussing differences between customary
and conventional international law).
73. Hague Regulations, supra note 4, art. 43. Article 43 provides that after assuming the authority of the previous sovereign power, the occupying power "shall take all
the measures in his power to restore and ensure ...

public order and safety." Id. The

occupying power is obliged to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory unless
absolutely prevented from doing so. Id.
74. Id. See e.g. H.C. 97/79, Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria
Region, 33(3) Piskei Din 309 (1979), translatedin 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 343, 345
(1979) (holding that deportation was ordered to maintain order and security, a legitimate reason under article 43 of the Hague Regulations).
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istration imposes include the restrictions of movement, detention, deportation, and demolition of houses.
2. The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention
The binding nature of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention is a much debated topic. 5 The Convention is generally regarded as
contractual in nature, obligating only signatory nations to its requirements. 6 In the Israeli system, a rule of international law is not binding
unless Israel has promulgated legislation incorporating the rule of law
into the local system."
Although Israel ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1951,78
the question of applicability to the occupied territories remains open
because of interpretive problems. 9 The Convention stipulates that it
applies to the occupation of the territory of a "High Contracting
Party."' 0 This phrase suggests that the territory occupied was previously under the sovereignty of one of the signatory states and, thus, the
Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable only when a legitimate sovereign was ousted from the territory."" The international community considered Jordanian occupation of the West Bank prior to 1967 a belligerent occupation."2 Therefore, because the West Bank was not the
75. See E. COHEN, supranote 1,at 43-56 (presenting conflicting views of the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Israeli occupied territories).
76. Id.
77.
SYSTEM

ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL, THE LEGAL AND ADIINISTRATIVE
13 (1985). [hereinafter AsSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL]. Custom-

ary international law, on the other hand, does not require legislation to become effective. Id.
78. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 44. Israel ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention on
July 6, 1951, subject to recognition of the Israeli Star of David emblem. Id. at 58 n.51.
79. Boyd, The Applicability of InternationalLaw to the Occupied Territories,in I
ISR. Y.B. Hum. RTS. 258, 260 (1971) [hereinafter Boyd].
80. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2).
81. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 44; see NATIONAL LAWYERS GuILD REPORT, supra
note 45, at xv (asserting that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply
where a belligerent occupant has ousted a legitimate sovereign from the occupied
territory).
Another interpretation of article 2, paragraph 2 is that a territory is deemed occupied territory wherever it is taken through military conquest, regardless of the identity
of the displaced sovereign. Boyd, supra note 79, at 258. A third view is that, with
respect to the Israeli-occupied territories, the area is not occupied because the Palestinian people are the true sovereign of the area, and any occupant holds it as a trustee.
Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel'sPresencein the Ivest Bank, 14
HARV.

INT'L L.J. 1, 35 (1973).

82. See Shamgar, The Observance of InternationalLaw in the Administered Territories, in I IsR. Y.B. Hum. RT. 262, 265 (1971) [hereinafter Shamgar] (stating that
Jordan annexed the West Bank). Only the United Kingdom and Pakistan recognized
the legitimacy of Jordanian sovereignty over the territory. Id.
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territory of a "High Contracting Party" at the time the Israeli occupa-

tion began, the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention do not apply to the Israeli administration of the occupied territory. 83 The Israeli
government, however, has accepted the humanitarian provisions of the
Convention.8 The military administration of the occupied territories
has incorporated the provisions of the Convention and specifically requires every soldier in the Israel Defense Forces to comply with the
Convention.8" Despite these measures, Israel does not consider the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention an internal law of Israel that
87
a person can enforce in the domestic courts. 86 The United Nations
and the United States, 88 however, contend that the Fourth Geneva
Convention is fully applicable to the Israeli occupied territories.
The Fourth Geneva Convention articulates measures to ensure an orderly administration of an occupied territory. The Convention provides
that an occupying power can suspend or repeal the penal laws of the
occupied territories if these laws constitute a threat to the security of
the occupying power. 89 The Convention also provides that military
courts have jurisdiction over the residents of the territories who have
allegedly committed security offenses.90 The Convention explicitly per83. See E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 45 (discussing that a formal acknowledgment
of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention is tantamount to recognition of
Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank and Egyptian sovereignty over Gaza).
84. See Shamgar, supra note 82, at 263 (asserting that automatic application of
the Fourth Geneva Convention would raise complicated political and juridical
problems). The humanitarian provisions of the Convention, however, address human
beings in distress as victims of war, rather than the political interests of states. Id. But
see H. BIN TALAL, supra note 14, at 75 (arguing that the Fourth Geneva Convention
does not lend itself to a distinction between humanitarian legal protection and territorial application of law).
85. General Staff of the I.D.F., Order No. 33.0133; Military Justice Code No.
1.33, cited in E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 483 n.46.
86. See Abu El-Tin v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 500/72,27(1) Piskei Din 481
(1972), translated in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. Ris. 376 (1975) (asserting that the Fourth
Geneva Convention is not an internal law in an Israeli domestic court); Mustafa v.
Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 629/82, 37(1) Piskei
Din 158 (1982), in 14 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 313 (1984) (holding that an individual
cannot invoke the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Israeli Supreme Court).
87. See G.A. Res. 2546, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969) (declaring the importance of respecting and implementing human rights protection in occupied territories).
88. See Address by Ambassador Charles Yost, United States Representative to the
United Nations Security Council, reprinted in 61 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 76 (1969) (voicing
United States opposition to the Israeli administration of East Jerusalem).
89. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 64.
90. Id. art. 66. In accordance with article 64, which allows the occupying power to
maintain order in the occupied territory, article 66 provides: "the Occupying Power
may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on
conditions that the said courts sit in the occupied country." Id.
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mits the detention of individuals for security reasons"1 and recognizes
the possibility of property demolition for security purposes. 2 The Convention, however, proscribes the use of deportations regardless of the
93
motive for using them.

The Convention provides basic protection to those who commit offenses in the occupied territory. When authorities detain or arrest indi-

viduals accused of terrorist activity, authorities must specify the
charge, 9" place of detention, 5 and time and place of the hearing. 0 The
Convention includes a right to counsel9 7 and the right to call wit-

nesses.98 Additionally, the Convention provides for the review of deten-

tion orders9 9 and a right to appeal all decisions issued against inhabi-

tants of the occupied territory. 10
Indeed, Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention provide Israel with certain powers necessary for administering the occupied territories. Additionally, the Regulations and the Convention af91.

Id. art. 78. Article 78 provides that the occupying power may, for imperative

reasons of security, subject offenders to assigned residence or internment. Id.
92. Id. art. 53. Article 53 permits the occupying power to destroy real or personal
property where military operations render such destruction absolutely necessary. Id.;
see also J.S. PIcrEr, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION 302 (1958) (stating that

an occupying power may demolish public or private property in the occupied territory

for imperative military objectives).
93. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 49. Article 49 proscribes the
deportation of protected persons from the occupied territory. Id. But see Abu Awad v.
Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 97/79, 33(3) Piskei Din 309
(1979), translatedin 9 IsR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 343, 345 (1979) (upholding a deportation
order issued to maintain order and security). The Israeli court concluded that such a
deportation is legitimate under article 43 of the Hague Regulations. Id. The President
of the Supreme Court of Israel reasoned that article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention was intended to prevent the perpetration of atrocities similar to those committed in
Germany during the Second World War, when millions of people were deported from
their homes. Id. Article 49, the court continued, was not intended to proscribe isolated,
security-based deportations. Id.
Another argument suggests that article 49 does not apply in the deportation setting,
because the article prohibits deportation to the territory of the occupying power or to
the territory of another country. Shamgar, supra note 82, at 274. Deporting persons to
Jordan is considered a return or exchange of a prisoner to the country on whose behalf
he has acted. Id. There is, however, no rule against returning agents of a hostile state
to the hostile state. Id.
94. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 71. The occupying power must
immediately inform the accused person in writing of the charges against him or her,
and insure that the accused understands the particular charges against him or her. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. art. 72. Accused persons have the right to present any and all evidence
necessary to exculpate themselves. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. art. 43.
100. Id.
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ford the inhabitants of the occupied territories protection against
arbitrary military actions. This international framework regarding the
administration of the occupied territories has a significant influence on
the Israel administration of the territories.
B.

ISRAELI DOMESTIC AUTHORITY

According to international law, the military administration is required to maintain order and ensure the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the territory.10 ' The Israeli administration endeavors to
control the occupied territories within the requirements of international
law. Israel's own particular security concerns, however, demand additional legislation to administer the occupied territories. 10
1. The Military Administration
Following its assumption of power in the occupied territories, the Israeli government issued Proclamation No. 1.103 This proclamation provided that the Israeli military administration would ensure public order
and safety while respecting the laws already in force in the country
unless absolutely prevented from doing so. 04 Jordanian law continues
to apply to civil matters and criminal conduct that poses no threat to
the security of Israel or its administration of the occupied territories.10
101. Hague Regulations, supra note 4, art. 43. The occupying power is entitled to
take all measures necessary to restore and maintain public order and safety. Id.
102. See ISRAEL NATIONAL SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 6 (1981) [hereinaf-

ter ICJ ISRAEL SECTION] (discussing the legislative authority of Israel under international law). Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, that requires an occupying power to
restore and ensure public order and safety, and article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that provides the occupying power the authority to enact penal provisions,
forms the basis of Israeli authority to enact security legislation. Id.
103. Proclamations, Orders & Appointments of the IDF's Command (Judea and
Samaria), no. 1, at 3, cited in E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 92 n.101. Similar proclamations were issued for the other occupied areas. Id.
104. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 92; see Arnon v. Attorney General, H.C. 507/72,
27 (1) Piskei Din 233, translatedin 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 334, 336 (1979) (holding
that the occupation of enemy territory creates the rights to proclaim a military government and to do everything necessary to secure public order and the safety of the
population).
The military administration retained the local laws that existed in the territories
prior to the June 1967. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 93. Ottoman law, British
mandatory law, and Jordanian law remain in force in the West Bank. Ottoman law,
British mandatory law, and Egyptian military orders and proclamations remain in
force in the Gaza Strip. Id.
105. ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL, supra note 77, at 23; see ICJ
ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 25 (stating that Israeli legislation interfering with
the criminal jurisdiction of the local courts applies only to security offenses). The only
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The Israeli military courts are the central judicial bodies dealing
with security offenders.106 According to international law, a military
administration is empowered to establish military courts that have jurisdiction over inhabitants of the occupied territory 07 who breach the
peace or security of the territory.10 8 The Regional Commander appoints the president and two judges comprising the military court.1 °9
Convictions and sentences of the military courts are subject to the approval of the Area Commander. 1
Trials before the military courts are held in accordance with the evidentiary rules and procedures of the common law system."' 1 There is
currently no military court of appeals, but verdicts of the military
courts are appealable to the regional commanders. 2 The Israeli Suother example of a change made to Jordanian law was the abolition of capital punishment, previously permitted under Jordanian law. Order Concerning Local Courts
(Death Penalty), No. 268 (1968), cited in ICJ ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 25
n.26.
106. Drori, The Legal System of Judea and Samaria:A Review of the Previous
Decade with a Glance at the Future, 8 ISR. Y.B. HuM. Rrs. 144, 154 (1978).
107. Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, Gaza Region, Golan Heights,
Sinai and Southern Sinai-Criminal Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) (Extension of
Validity) Law, 32 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 58 (1977), cited in ICJ ISRAEL
SECTION,

supra note 102, at 32 n.56.

108. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 66 (stating that military
courts may try cases involving those who breach the penal provisions of the laws applicable in occupied territory); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing
the authority of an occupying power to establish a judicial system in an occupied
territory).
It is a generally accepted principle of international law that an occupying power and
its administrators are not subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts. See G. VON
GLAHN, supra note 64, at 108 (stating that the inhabitants of an occupied territory
cannot sue occupation authorities in local courts); see also Order Concerning Local
Courts (Status of Israel Defence Forces Authorities), Order 104, § 2(a) (1967), cited
in ICJ ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 13 n.5 (stating that the authorities and
employees of the State of Israel, the Israel Defence Forces, and authorities appointed
by the Regional Commander are not subject to local court jurisdiction).
109. ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RiGrrs IN ISRAEL, supra note 77, at 24.
110. Id.
111. INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND COMPARATIVE LAW OF THE
FACULTY OF LAW AT THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM, LAW AND COURTS IN
THE ISRAEL-HELD AREAS 9 (1970) [hereinafter LAW AND COURTS]. The practices of

common law systems include the presentation of a written statement of charge, a requirement that the proceedings occur in the presence of the accused, the publicity of
proceedings, the translation of proceedings for the accused, the right of the accused to
select counsel, and the right to produce witnesses. Id.
112. Id. The Israeli practice is consistent with the requirement of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 73. Article 73 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that where the applicable laws do not provide
for appeals, the convicted person has a right to petition against the finding and sentence to a designated authority of the occupying power. Id. This right of appeal is
granted only to a convicted person and not to the prosecutor. ICJ ISRAEL SECTION,
supra note 102, at 29.
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preme Court however, has urged the government to create an appeal
court in the occupied territories.' 1 3 The Israeli Supreme Court entitles
inhabitants of the occupied territories to a direct appeal concerning decisions and actions of the military authorities." 4 The actions of the military are tested according to existing Israeli laws, local Jordanian laws,
orders of the regional commander, and rules of international law incorporated into Israeli law." 5
2. Administrative Security Regulations

The military administration operates under the Order Concerning
Security Instructions (OCSI) which embodies the criminal security
code of each territory."' The OCSI contains changes made in the
Emergency Defence Regulations instituted during the British Mandate
that remain in force in the territories."7 The security measures em113. Clines, Justices Favor Appeals in Occupied Territories, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1988, at A6, col. 5.
114. See Cohen, Justicefor Occupied Territory? The Israeli High Court of Justice
Paradigm,24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 471, 473 (1986) (evaluating the effectiveness
of the Israeli Supreme Court in protecting the human rights of the inhabitants of the
occupied territories). The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over appeals from the occupied territories is founded on principles of personal jurisdiction. Israeli Courts Law §

7(b)(2), 9

LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

157-58 (1957), cited in Cohen, supra, at

475.
Former Attorney General Meir Shamgar is credited with providing access to the
Supreme Court for West Bank inhabitants. Shamgar believed in the necessity of an
extra-military opportunity for appeal. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 80. Allowing residents of occupied territories access to the Supreme Court of the occupant is unprecedented in international practice. Morgenstern, Validity of the Acts of the Belligerent
Occupant, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 291 n.1 (1951).
115. ICJ ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 38.
116. Order Concerning Security Regulations, no. 3, 1967, cited in E. COHEN, supra
note 1, at 94 n.109; see LAW AND COURTS, supra note 11l, at 8 (outlining the major
provisions of the Order).
117. Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), cited
in Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 97/79, 33(3)
Piskei Din 309 (1979), translated in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 343, 343 (1979). The
British used the Defence Regulations to repress terrorist activities of Zionist organizations. R. SHEHADEH, WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW 24 (1980). When the Mandate ended, Jordan controlled the West Bank and issued a proclamation that all regulations and laws in force would continue to apply. Id. It is argued that Jordan repealed
the Regulations after the merger of the West Bank with the East Bank in 1950. Israel
is accused of reactivating the Regulations to repress the hostile Arab inhabitants. Id. at
24-25.
To remove any doubt as to the applicability of the Regulations, the administration
upheld the validity of the Regulations. Order Concerning Interpretation (Additional
Provisions) (No. 224) 1968. The Israeli Supreme Court has held that the Regulations
apply to the territories. See Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 97/79, 33(3) Piskei Din 309 (1979), translated in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
343, 345 (1979) (rejecting contentions that the Defence Regulations are no longer in
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ployed against terrorists are applied pursuant to the Defence Regulations.118 The Defence Regulations authorize administrative detention11 9
and the deportation of any person who threatens the security, safety,
and defense of the area.1 2 ° In addition, the Regulations allow the military commander to order the1 destruction
of any house used in the prep21
activities.
terrorist
of
aration

3. The ProceduralProtection of Offenders
The military administration provides juridical safeguards to prevent
the abuse of military discretion. The procedural rights guaranteed to

the accused security offenders generally include those afforded criminal
defendants in common law systems including the right to counsel, the
right to specific charges, the right to proceedings
in the presence of the
1 22
accused, and the right to present witnesses.
The military administration has created Appeals Boards to hear appeals of the orders of the military administration. 23 The Regional
Commander has historically accepted the recommendations of the Appeals Board. 2 4 The appellant retains the option to petition the Israel
Supreme Court to review the decision of the Regional Commander. 20
force). The court cited the Law and Administration Proclamation, issued at the commencement of the occupation, that provides for the continued application of existing
laws unless inconsistent with other military orders. Id. at 309-10.
More recently, in Nazal v. Commander of the Judea and SamariaRegion, the Supreme Court concluded that the Defence Regulations would remain in force until explicitly repealed. Nazal v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 513/
85, (39)3 Piskei Din 645 (1985), in 16 IsR. Y.B. Hum. Rrs. 329, 329 (1986); see
Cohen, Justicefor Occupied Territory? The Israeli High Court of Justice Paradigm,
supra note 114, at 483 (asserting that Israel considers the Regulations still applicable
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip because neither the Jordanian or Egyptian Governments had repealed them).
118.
E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 94.
119.
Id. Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) Palestine Gazette (No. 1442),
Regulation II1(1) at p. 1298-1300, cited in E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 122 n.218.
120. Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) Palestine Gazette (No. 1442). Regulation 112, at p. 1300, cited in E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 94 n.137.
121. Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), Regulation 119(1) at p. 1302, cited in E. COHEN, supra note I, at 94 n.137.
122. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (listing the procedures guaranteed
under the common law system).
123. ICJ ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 17. But c.f. R. SHEHADEH, supra
note 117, at 30 (noting the law success rate of appeals to the Boards). In 1979, for
example, appellants were successful in only four of nineteen appeals filed with the
Board. ICJ ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 19. In seven cases, the appellants withdrew their appeal. Id. Another four appeals were dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id.
The remaining cases are undecided. Id.
124. ICJ ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 18.
125. Id. at 17-18; see supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the right
of appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court).
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In 1979, the Defence Regulations were amended to afford more legal
protection to detained security offenders.12 An objective standard replaced the former subjective evaluation of security offenses.121 The new
law limits detention to six months, and requires review of the reasons
for detention at the three month interval.128 In addition, the detention
order is subject to the district court president's mandatory review
within forty-eight hours of arrest. 29
The legal framework demonstrates that the Israeli military administration is permitted to focus on the legitimate security interests of
Israel in issuing orders against security offenders. The system does,
however, allow for the predominance of security concerns to the detriment of procedural concerns. The Supreme Court has yet to articulate
a standard of review and a precise definition of Israeli security interests. Without a precise standard of review, the court is not bound to
consistent decisions.
III. ARRESTING TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The Israeli military administration in the territories is empowered to
order countermeasures when it believes an individual represents a security risk to the state or public.' 30 The primary countermeasures employed against suspected terrorists are restriction of movement, administrative detention, deportation, and the demolition of houses. These
sanctions are, in theory, tailored to specific offenses.

126.

Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 5379-1979, 33 LAws OF THE STATE OF
89 (1979) cited in Saitman, The Use of the Mandatory Emergency Laws by the
Israeli Government, 10 INT'L J. Soc. L. 385, 387 n.3 (1982). Although intended to
provide more legal protection to security offenders, the amended regulations still evoke
criticism. See id. at 393 (arguing that the 1979 amendments allow Israel to maintain a
ISRAEL

self-image of democracy both for its Jewish citizens and the outside world, while at the
same time enabling Israel to selectively infringe upon the elementary civil rights of its
Arab citizens).

127.

Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 5379-1979, 33

LAws OF THE STATE OF

89 (1979), § 2 cited in Rudolph, The Judicial Review of Administrative Detention Orders in Israel, 14 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 148, 151 (1984).
ISRAEL

128.

Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 5379-1979, 33

LAWS OF THE STATE OF

89 (1979), § 2(b), 4, cited in Rudolph, The Judicial Review of Administrative
Detention Orders in Israel, 14 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 148, 151 (1984).
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 116-21 (discussing the Order Concerning Security Instructions and the Emergency Defence Regulations, which govern the implementation of
sanctions against alleged security offenders).
ISRAEL
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A.

RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT

Restriction of the movement of suspected terrorists within the occupied territories is the least severe measure employed to counter terrorist
activity. 1 ' This measure allows the security authorities to monitor the
movement of potential terrorists and prevent them from joining other
terrorists within and beyond Israeli territory. 3 2 Restriction of movement is generally used when the actions of individuals do not warrant
either deportation or detention.1 3 3 If the individual's activities become
more dangerous, authorities may implement more severe measures.'3
B.

DETENTION ORDERS

When monitoring the moves of a potential terrorist is insufficient to

alleviate the security risks, the military administration issues detention
orders as a second countermeasure. 35 Administrative detention involves
the confinement of individuals by administration officials to prevent
them from participating in terrorist activities and is employed when
resort to judicial procedures is ineffective or unavailable. 3 0 Even
though detention orders are characterized as preventive rather than punitive in nature, they are considered a severe sanction. 37 Consequently,
Israeli officials issue administrative detention orders only when less re131. Order Concerning Security Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (No. 378), art.

85a(1-4); see Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 78 (allowing an occupying
power, for reasons of security, to subject an inhabitant to an assigned residence).
132. See Badir v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 386/85, 39(a), Piskei Din 54 (1985)
(upholding a military order preventing defendant from travelling to Mecca on a pilgrimage because he had allegedly engaged in terrorist activities and Israeli authorities
feared he would make contact with terrorist groups while in Mecca).
133. E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 128-29.
134. Id.
135. Order Concerning Security Instruction (Judea and Samaria) No. 815, art. 87
(amend. 18) (5740/1980) 46 K.M. Judea and Samaria, cited in ICJ ISRLAEL SECTION,
supra note 102, at 72 n.22 (1981).
136. Shetreet, A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law." An Assessment of the Israeli Law, 14 ISR. Y.B. Hum. Rrs. 182, 196-97 (1984). Judicial procedures may be ineffective or unavailable due to lack of evidence or the inadmissibility of
evidence. Id. In the ordinary criminal process it is difficult to prove that people organize into secretive groups to perpetrate terrorist attacks against civilians. Id. Detention
orders are issued when authorities receive evidence from confidential sources that is
inadmissable as evidence to a court. Id. at 197. Sources of intelligence are not disclosed
for fear of reprisals against informers. Id.
137. See Qawasma v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 1/82, 36(1) Piskei Din 666
(1982), translated in Rudolph, The Judicial Review of Administrative Detention Orders, 14 ISR. Y.B. Hut. Rs. 148, 153 n.18 (1984) [hereinafter Rudolph] (asserting
that the object of administrative detention is not to punish someone for past activities,
but to prevent the individual from posing a danger in the future); Lerner v. Minister of
Defence, A.A.D. 2/82 (1982) (stating that the military views the measures implemented against security offenders as preventive in nature).
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strictive methods are unavailable."3 8
C. DEPORTATION

The most severe sanction available to the military administration is
the deportation from the occupied territories of saboteurs, members of
terrorist organizations, and individuals acting on behalf of heighboring
Arab nations.139 The military commander of the region is authorized to
deport a person who threatens the security, safety, and defense of the
territory. 40 Deportation is employed when the accused poses a continuous security risk in the occupied territory.' Deportation ordinarily occurs after the individual is detained and the military authorities determine that releasing the individual 2 threatens the security, safety, and
4
defense of the occupied territory.
D.

DEMOLITION OF HOUSES

The military administration orders 43 the demolition of houses in
which terrorists reside, acts of terrorism are prepared or committed, or
arms or sabotage materials are found. 44 Demolition is ordered where
138. See Qawasma v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 1/82 36 Piskei Din 666, 669
(1982), translated in Rudolph, supra note 137, at 153 (arguing for limiting the power
to detain to where the danger to society is so serious that detention is the only way to
avert unrest).
139. Shamgar, supra note 82, at 273.
140. Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442) Reg.
108, 112 (Supp. II Sept. 27, 1945); contra Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4,
art. 49 (prohibiting the deportation of individuals from occupied territories under all
circumstances). See Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defence, H.C.
97/72, 26 Piskei Din 574 (1972), translatedin 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354, 355 (1972)
(holding that military occupation suspends the powers of the former sovereign of the
occupied territory and, pursuant to article 43 of the Hague Regulations, those powers
pass de facto to the occupant).
141. Shamgar, supra note 82, at 274.
142. Id.
143. Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), 1071,
Reg. 119, para. 2 (Supp. II, Sept. 27, 1945), cited in E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 99.
144. Shamgar, supra note 82, at 270; see Motzlah v. Minister of Defence, H.C.
572/82, 36(4) Piskei Din 610 (1982), cited in Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews,
Demolition of Houses and Deportations:An Analysis of Measure Employed by Israel
in the Administered Territories, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 515, 551 n.227 (1987) (upholding the destruction of a house whose inhabitants participated in a fatal bomb attack
and other terrorist activities); Sakhwil v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 434/79, 34(1) Piskei Din 464 (1980), translatedin 10 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
345, 345-46 (1980) (sustaining an order to seal off the room of petitioner's son who had
provided refuge to a member of AI-Fatah and had hidden explosives in the room);
Khamed v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 22/81, 35(3) Piskei
Din 223 (1981), translated in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 365, 365-66 (1981) (affirming
an order to seal a room because one of its occupants was arrested for throwing hand
grenades at buses and assassinating Arabs who cooperated with Israel).
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the destruction of the home bears a direct relation to the goal of deterring terrorist activity.145 Alternately, the military administration seals
off houses or rooms associated with terrorist activities. 140 The military
seals off rooms and houses in situations where the terrorist resides in a
house or an apartment building with other innocent family members or
neighbors.147 Sealing off houses or rooms is a less drastic measure than
demolition because it provides 8the authorities the opportunity to revoke
14
the measure at a later date.
The sanctions available to the military administrators of the occupied territories are designed to alleviate threats of terrorist activity. Although presented in degrees of severity, the measures the Israeli administration has employed are often not proportionate to the crimes
committed. An examination of the judicial treatment of the territories
demonstrates the inconsistent implementation of these
countermeasures.
IV. TREATMENT OF SECURITY OFFENDERS
The Israeli Supreme Court has not followed a uniform standard in
evaluating the implementation of military orders against security offenders. The standard the court employs depends on the factual setting
of each case. This approach is practicable because it allows the court to
uphold a particular measure based on individualized security threats.
At the same time, however, this standard affords the military authorities a degree of discretion that is potentially abusive of the procedural
rights of offenders.
A.

REVIEW OF MILITARY ORDERS DEMONSTRATE ARBITRARINESS

It is unclear under Israeli precedent whether a procedural flaw is
severe enough to warrant reversal of a military order. The Israeli Su145.

A. GERSON, supra note 21, at 162; see N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at Al, cal.

2 (discussing the demolition of houses in Gaza undertaken in response to hijacking of a
public bus). The houses were demolished to deter subsequent acts of violence. Id.

146. See Shamgar, supra note 82, at 275 (noting the distinction between actual
demolition and constructive demolition); see Khamed v. Commander of the Judea and
Samaria Region, H.C. 22181, 35(3) Piskei Din 223 (1981), translated in II ISR. Y.B.

Hum. Ris. 365, 365-66 (1981) (upholding an order sealing off the rooms of individuals
arrested for terrorist acts).
147.

A. GERSON supra note 21, at 167; see E. COHEN, supra note 1, at 96 (discuss-

ing criteria for sealing off houses). The military authorities seal rooms rather than
order the demolition of houses when the owners of the houses were innocent relatives of
the alleged terrorists. Id. Khamed v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region,
H.C. 22/81, 35(3) Piskei Din 223 (1981), translatedin II IsR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 365,
365-66 (1981).
148.
ICJ ISRAEL SECTION, supra note 102, at 70.
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preme Court has cancelled preventive detention orders solely due to
procedural flaws with respect to the time and place of detention.14 The
court has, however, upheld a deportation order despite denial of the
right to appeal the order before its implementation. 50
In Al Karbutli v. Minister of Defence, 5' the court cancelled a detention order because the advisory committee that considers the objections
5 Simof detainees was not appointed at the time the order was issued.5'
53
ilarly, in Al Kouri v. Chief of Staff,1 the court rescinded a detention
order for failure to specify the place of detention.'" In Kawasme v.
Minister of Defence,155 the court granted a petition of review to two
mayors from Hebron,'156 who were denied the right to appeal a deportation order before an advisory board. 57 The mayors were denied the
right to challenge the legality of the order 58 because the deportation
was carried out immediately. 59 On appeal to the Israeli Supreme
Court, the military authorities, in defense of the expulsions, argued
that the strained security situation prevailing on the night of the attack
on Jewish residents justified expedient action. 60 The court, however,
held that compelling security grounds do not justify ignoring the duty
to observe the rule of law.' 6 ' The mayors were given an opportunity to
appeal to the advisory board, 62 but the deportation orders remained
149. See Al Karbutli v. Minister of Defence H.C. 7/48, 2 Piskei Din 5, cited in
Rudolph, supra note 137, at 150 (cancelling a detention order because the committee
that reviewed the order had not been appointed at the required time); Al Kouri v.
Chief of Staff H.C. 95/49, 4 Piskei Din 34A, 46 (cancelling a detention order because
it did not specify the location of detention).
150. See Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(3) Piskei Din 113
(1980), translated in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 344, 345 (1981).
151. Al Karbutli v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 7/48, 2 Piskei Din 5, cited in Rudolph, supra note 137, at 150.
152. Id.
153. Al Kouri v. Chief of Staff, H.C. 95/46, 4 Piskei Din 34A, 46, cited in Rudolph, supra note 137, at 150.
154. Id.
155. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(3) Piskei Din 113 (1980),
translated in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 344 (1981).
156. Id. at 344. The deportations were a response to a Palestinian attack that killed
six Jews.
157. Id. The deportation order, however, was ultimately sustained. Id. at 354.
158. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(3) Piskei Din 113 (1980),
translated in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 344 (1981).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 346. In the opinion of Justice Landau, a reasonable interpretation of the
statutory right to appeal to the board is that the right should be granted before the
deportation is carried out. Id. at 345.
162. Id. at 347. The petition of a third deportee, who had delivered speeches calling
for the extermination of the State of Israel, was totally rejected. Id.
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effective.1 6 3
In the alternative, another case demonstrates respect for the rights of

security offenders that culminated in the cancellation of a detention
order. In Qawasma v. Minister of Defence,'" the court, on appeal, can-

celled an improperly issued detention order.1 66 The defendant
Qawasma, was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment for charges of
membership in an unlawful organization and planting bombs where
likely to cause death or injury. 8 The decision, however, was not based
167
on a unanimous verdict as required under the Defence Regulations.
Although given an opportunity to appeal the conviction, the petitioner
was detained pending the appeal to prevent any anticipated criminal
activity from materializing.168 The detention order was ultimately cancelled because the Minister of Defence used the detention power to
hold defendant until his appeal, a different objective than intended. 6
B.

MEASURES DISPROPORTIONATE TO OFFENSE COMMITTED

It is unclear what degree of terrorist threat warrants a particular
security measure. Examination of three Israel Supreme Court decisions
indicates that military authorities have issued sanctions that national

security concerns do not justify. In one case, individuals were deported
163. Id. at 346. Justice Cahan concurred in the decision upholding the deportation
order but he believed that extraordinary circumstances existed which justified an emergency exception and the immediate execution of the deportation orders. Id. at 347.
In dissent, Justice Cohn argued that the law must prevail even where terrorists are
concerned and supported annulment of the deportation orders. Id. at 350. He asserted
that, "in a law abiding state, no security, political, ideological or other consideration
may justify violation of the law by the authorities." Id.; see also Ycridor Chairman
Central Elections Committee, 19(3) Piskei Din 365 (1965), cited in Rudolph, supra
note 137, at 175 (arguing against the denial of an alleged criminal's rights, no matter
how dangerous he may appear).
164. Qawasma v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 1/82, 36(1) Piskei Din 666 (1982),
cited in Rudolph, supra note 137, at 153.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), Reg.
31.
168. Qawasma v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 1/82, 36(1) Piskei Din 666 (1982),
cited in Rudolph, supra note 137, at 168. The court held that the security threat was so
serious that detention was the only means of avoiding harm. Id. The president of the
district court confirmed the detention order based on evidence that the petitioner received special training in explosives while in Damascus, Syria and evidence that he
prepared to use explosives against civilians. Id. The president concluded that "detainee's past-that is the offenses attributed to him, constitute a red light as regards
the future." Id.
169. Id. at 169. Detaining the petitioners until the appeal was not the objective of
the legislature when it empowered the Minister of Defence to issue detention orders.
Id.
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simply for their membership in terrorist organizations.'
In Nazal v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region,1 71 three

West Bank inhabitants were deported because they served in terrorist
organizations.' 7 2 The petitioners had, however, committed no overt ac-

tivities that would warrant such a punishment. 173 Alternatively, in
Bathish v. Minister of Defence,17 4 the petitioners actually took steps to
incite civil disobedience among the Arab population." 5 Their actions of
incitement, however, did not include physical assaults and were held
not to constitute a serious infringement on security. 76 The Israeli Supreme Court, accordingly, overturned the detention order.177 In another
case, Motzlah v. Minister of Defence, the court upheld a demolition

order, despite the fact that the incident leading to the demolition order
occurred two years prior to the issuance of the order. The demolition
order was not tailored to respond
to any immediate threat nor could it
1 78
serve any deterrent purpose.
C.

DISPARITY IN TREATMENT OF ARAB AND JEWISH TERRORISTS

The disproportionate emphasis the court places on security concerns
is also demonstrated in its disparate treatment of Arab terrorists and
Jewish terrorists. Jewish settlers are not subject to the judicial system
of the military administration. For example, in Al-Natshe v. Minister
of Defence,1 9 the mayor of Hebron requested the removal of Jewish
170. Nazal v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 513/85, 3a(3)
Piskei Din 645 (1985), translatedin 16 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 32 (1986).
171.

Id.

172. Id. at 329.
173. Id. The court denied the appeal based on a standard of "clear, convincing and
unequivocal information" that the requirements for deportation were satisfied. These
requirements include: necessity of securing public peace, the protection of the region,
the maintenance of public order or the suppression of mutiny, rebellion or riot. Id.
174. Bathish v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 18/82 (1982), cited in Rudolph, supra
note 137, at 170.
175.

Id.

176. Id. at 173; see also Dweikat v. Government of Israel, H.C. 390/79, 27(1)
Piskei Din 113 (1979), translatedin 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345, 350 (1979) (holding
that the alleged security concerns were insufficient to justify the particular order). The
petitioner, Dweikat challenged the legitimacy of the government-established Jewish settlement on his privately-owned land. Id. at 345. The government contended that the
land was requisitioned for legitimate security purposes. Id. The court, however, concluded that military considerations were secondary to political reasons and did not justify the taking of the property. Id. at 349.
177.

Id.

178. Motzlah v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 572/82, 36(4) Piskei Din 610 (1982),
cited in Reicin, supra note 144, at 551.
179. Al Natshe v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 175/81, 35(3) Piskei Din 361 (1981),
translated in 13 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 359 (1983).
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inhabitants who were harassing neighboring Arabs in effect to force
them out of the area. 180 The authorities, however, refused the request
for a removal order despite evidence of unsatisfactory treatment of the
Arab inhabitants of Hebron. 8 '
In 1982, fifteen members of a Jewish terrorist organization attempted to kill prominent Arab officials.182 The Jewish terrorists were
charged with planting bombs on Arab buses and conspiring to firebomb
Moslem places of worship.18 3 Three were convicted of murder and received life sentences.18 4 Twelve were found guilty of lesser felonies and
sentenced to seven-year terms, and one was released. 18 The cases
demonstrate that Jewish terrorists have received lighter penalties than
Arab terrorists. 88 This disparate treatment could result from subjecting Jews to Israeli law and Arabs to military law.
D.

IN SEARCH OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD

The court has, on occasion, articulated and applied an objective standard in which the means employed were narrowly tailored to the end
that the military sought to prevent. In Zakut v. IDF Commander in
the Gaza Strip,187 the court upheld an order restricting movement as a
necessary preventive measure to enable security authorities to supervise
the appellant's movements and actions.' 88 The military administration
ordered the defendant to reside solely in a refugee camp for six months,
not to change his residence without permission, and to present himself
daily at the Gaza Police Station. 89 These actions were taken in re180. Id. at 359.
181.

Id. at 360. The Minister of Defence and the Military Commander subse-

quently assured the court that they would treat future complaints with due gravity. Id.
182.
183.
184.

Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 25, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
Id.
Id.

185. Id. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir has led a campaign for clemency for the
remaining terrorists in prison. Id.
186. See D. HiasT, supra note 2, at 393 (discussing the resignation of Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp, who resigned as chairman of a committee investigating
Jewish vigilantism in the occupied territories). In her inquiry, Karp concluded that
authorities condoned the acts of vandalism, sabotage, and assault attributed to Jews in
the territories. Id.
187. Zakut v. IDF Commander in the Gaza Strip, H.C. 370/84, 38(3) Piskei Din
726 (1984), translatedin 15 ISR. Y.B. HuMi. Ris. 280, 280 (1985).

188. Id. at 280; See Abu El-Tin v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 550/72, 27(1) Piskei
Din 481, 485 (1973), translatedin 5 ISR. Y.B. Hum. RTs. 72, 376, 378 (1975) (holding

that a military government is empowered to restrict entry into occupied territories and
supervise the movement of persons in the region).
189. Zakut v. IDF Commander in the Gaza Strip, H.C. 370/84, 38(3) Piskei Din
726 (1984), translatedin 15 ISR. Y.B. HUM. R-rs. 280, 280 (1985). Zakut alleged that
the restrictions prevented him from completing his university studies and from ob-
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sponse to evidence that he was a member of a terrorist organization
that had engaged in hostile activity on his university campus. 190 The
appellant's activities did not include overt dangerous activity and did
not justify more restrictive measures than limiting his movement.19 '
In another case, the military administration prohibited an appellant's
travel outside the territory when there was evidence that he would contact subversive elements abroad. 9 2 In Badir v. Minister of the
Interior,9 3 Badir was refused an exit permit to travel to Mecca because he had participated in outlawed terrorist organizations.19 ' The
authorities feared that while in Mecca the petitioner would contact elements of the hostile EI-Fatah Organization.' 95 The standard the court
used in upholding the order was that a reasonable apprehension of
prejudice to security justifies the refusal to grant an exit permit for
travel to a hostile country.' 6
Similarly, regarding the sealing off of houses, the Israeli Supreme
Court has upheld orders where particular terrorist activity justifies the
measure implemented. In Sakhwil v. Commander of the Judea and
Samaria Region, 9 7 the petitioner's son provided refuge to a member of
El-Fatah, and hid explosives in his room. 9 8 The room was sealed off to
deter others in the community from establishing bases for terrorist activity within their homes. 99
One example of proportionate treatment of Jewish terrorists is seen
in the Supreme Court decision, Kahane v. Minister of Defence.2 00 The
court upheld a detention order of Rabbi Kahane, an ultra-nationalist
leader of a Jewish vigilante group, to prevent him from implementing
intended attacks against Arabs.20 ' The court articulated an objective
taining medical treatment. Id. The court, however, held that he did not present sufficient proof of his alleged illness. Id. at 280-81.
190. Id. at 280.
191. Id.
192. Badir v. Minister of the Interior, H.C. 386/85, 39(3) Piskei Din 54 (1985),
translated in 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337, 338-39 (1986).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. The EI-Fatah Organization is the largest and dominant faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. R. HALABI supra note 34, at 95. Yassir Arafat is the
leader of the EI-Fatah organization. Id.
196. Badir v. Minister of the Interior, H.C. 386/85, 39(3) Piskei Din 54 (1985),
translated in 16 ISR. Y.B. Hum. Rrs. 337, 339 (1986).
197. Sakhwil v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 434/79,
34(1) Piskei Din 464 (1979), translatedin 10 IsR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 345 (1980).
198. Id. at 346.
199. Id.
200. Kahane v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 1/80, 35(2) Piskei Din 253 (1980),
cited in Rudolph, supra note 137, at 153.
201. Id. On appeal, Kahane asserted that detention is only applicable to those who
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balancing test, weighing the severity of the restrictions imposed on the
detainee against the severity of the threat posed to public security."'
Concluding that the security threat was so serious that there was no
other reasonable method of averting the danger, the court upheld the
detention order.203
As demonstrated in Israeli precedent, 04 the Israeli Supreme Court
supports an objective standard that balances offenders' rights and national security concerns. Additionally, the administration has amended
the detention laws to support this standard. 20 5 The lack of a defined
standard and consistent application of it invites severe criticism of the
manner in which the military administration deals with terrorists.2 0° A
specific objective standard would effectively balance Israeli security
concerns and procedural guarantees afforded security offenders.
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT:
BALANCING SECURITY INTERESTS AND THE RIGHTS OF
OFFENDERS
The goal underlying Israeli measures used against terrorists is to
place terrorists in a position where they no longer threaten state security or public welfare.20 7 The measures employed, whether preventive or
punitive, are intended to deter others contemplating similar violence. 08
The proportionality standard employed in Kahane weighs the severity
of the restrictions imposed against the severity of the security threat.
This standard, when clarified and refined, provides a viable framework
for the court to apply when reviewing all measures employed to counter
want to destroy the State of Israel, thus suggesting that detention orders are only appli-

cable to Arabs. Id. at 153, 162. The court concluded that the laws contain no such
restriction and are used to detain anyone who contemplates acts likely to impair national security regardless of whether that person believes he is acting in the interests of
the State. Id.
202.

Id. at 160.

203.

Id. Although the Supreme Court rejected Kahane's appeal, Menachem Begin,

while Minister of Defence, cancelled the detention order against Kahane. Id. at 162.

204. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the
court upheld orders disproportionate to the threat the actions of the petitioner poses to
public order and safety).

205.

See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the protections

that the 1979 amendments to the 1945 Defence Regulations afford detainees).
206. See Cohen, International Criticism of Israeli Security Measures in the
Occupied Territories,37 JERUSALEM PAPERS ON PEACE PROBLEMS 1 (1984) (surveying
international courts, individuals, and government reports on Israeli practices in the

territories).
207.

See Ginossar, Outlawing Terrorism, 13 ISR. L. REV. 150, 157 (1978) (con-

tending that active terrorists should be placed in a position where they can never again
participate in terrorist activities).
208. Id. at 153.
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terrorist activity. To clarify the balancing test employed in Kahane, it
is necessary to examine each measure individually.
A.

RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT

Restricting the movement of an alleged terrorist is a preventive measure. 0 9 This measure is responsive to less severe threats, such as, for
example, membership in a terrorist organization.2 1 0 This method is adequate to counter the threat the individual poses to state security or
public welfare. The military administration has placed restrictions on
the movement of Palestinians between the territories to presumably
prevent Palestinians from coordinating efforts against the military."'
Because membership in a terrorist organization poses a relatively moderate threat, a procedural flaw would justify the Supreme Court overturning an order restricting movement.
B.

CONSPIRACY

When an individual is found guilty of conspiring to commit overt
acts likely to injure many individuals, a more stringent measure is warranted. Detention ensures that individuals do not complete the intended
act and deters them and others from committing other potentially dangerous activities.212 A procedural flaw might justify reversal of a detention order because of the emphasis of the military administration on
the procedural protection of detainees.
C.

ACTS OF TERRORISM

If the terrorist act actually occurs, the military could justifiably issue
a deportation order. There is a strong likelihood that the individual
committing the act, if given the opportunity, would commit other heinous crimes.21 The Israelis maintain that deportation is the best
209. Zakut v. IDF Commander in the Gaza Strip, H.C. 370/84, 38(3) Piskei Din
726 (1984), translated in 15 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 280, 280 (1985).
210. See id. (holding that an order restricting movement was a necessary preventive measure because the petitioner is a member of a terrorist organization that engaged in hostile activities on his university campus).
211. Cowell, Strike Grips West Bank and Gaza As Two More PalestiniansKilled,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at A6, col. 5.
212. See Qawasma v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 1/82, 36(1) Piskei Din 666
(1982), cited in Rudolph, supra note 137, at 167 (holding that detention is preferred to
avert the potential danger).
213. See Friedman, Israeli Army Decides to Deport 9 Arabs in Wake of Rioting,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at A10, col. 1 (discussing the deportation of nine Arabs
from the occupied territories who were described as leading activists and organizers).
All nine had previously been arrested for subversive activities. Id.
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deterrent of subsequent violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Deportation is a permanent and, therefore, severe measure and is justified
only to counter an equally serious threat." 4 As such, the Military Commander must strictly follow procedure. However, because deportation is
warranted of the more dangerous offenders, it is doubtful that a procedural flaw would justify overturning an order. The military could, as in
Kawasma, return the deportees for an appeal and then, if sufficient evidence exists, reimpose the order.2 15
D.

DEMOLITION

Demolition is justified only as a response to acts of violence perpetrated from a terrorist base.2 16 The demolition of the homes of the families of those who engage in terrorist activity does not seem to bear a
sufficient relation to acts of terrorists and the military should avoid
such measures.21 ' Because demolition or sealing orders are issued immediately, the military must ensure that individuals, both the accused
and those whom the order effects, have opportunities to challenge the
order before its implementation. 18
As the act under investigation moves across the spectrum from preparation to perpetration, state security interests in averting the danger
clearly become greater. Each measure is appropriate only when there is
no other less restrictive means available to reach the end of deterring a
certain degree of terror. 219 As the measures increase in severity, the
214. See Frankel, Palestinians Criticize Military Courts, Wash. Post, Dec. 28,
1987, at A29, col. 3 (stating that Israeli officials consider deportation the most powerful weapon against Palestinian activists).
215. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(3) Piskei Din 113 (1980),
translatedin 11 IsR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 344, 347 (1981).
216. See Sakhwil v. Regional Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C.
434/79, 34(1) Piskei Din 464 (1980), translatedin 10 ISR. Y.B. Hum. RTs. 345, 24546 (1980) (upholding an order to seal off a room used to harbor terrorists and
explosives).
217. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD REPORT, supra note 45, at 66 (arguing that
the destruction of property belonging to persons other than those suspected of a crime
is a violation of article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 33 of the Convention proscribes collective punishments. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art.
33.
218. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD REPORT, supra note 45, at 67 (asserting that
demolitions are undertaken within a few days of arrest of a suspect, before any judicial
determination of guilt).
219. See Note, The Use of Force in Combatting Terrorism, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 377, 392-98 (1987) (discussing the use of force as a response to terrorism). The response of the injured state involves retaliation proportionate with the nature and gravity of the offense, and the necessity of countering its effect. Schachter,
Self Help in InternationalLaw: U.S. Action in the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 37 J. INT'L
AFF. 231, 234 (1984).
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need for procedural protection also increases. The extent of the threat
to security, however, counterbalances a potential overemphasis on procedural safeguards. Under this approach, a judicial determination of
what constitutes military necessity or danger to security is critical.22
CONCLUSION
The Israeli military administration advocates the supremacy of security concerns in the Supreme Court decisions reviewing measures issued against terrorists. The court must follow an objective standard to
determine whether procedural flaws justify cancelling a preventive
measure, or whether security concerns remain predominate and excuse
procedurally flawed security orders. The Israeli military administration
must promote as many procedural rights as possible to the extent that
security concerns allow. A proportionality standard would not diminish
the capacity of the court to rule based on individual circumstances, but
would reduce the opportunity for arbitrariness.
The present conditions in the West Bank have saddled Israel with a
unique and unparalleled situation of instability and legal uncertainty.
In this context, when presented with legitimate security threats and
real and imminent danger, Israeli authorities are then justified in attempting to thwart terrorist plans prior to perpetration. A judicial standard of proportionality will ensure basic procedural protections for the
accused and encourage authorities in the territories to take only those
actions necessary to deter and punish those who engage in acts of
aggression.

220. See Goodman, supra note 67, at 1578 n.21 (stating that military necessity is a
very broad notion that changes over time).

